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Obama Fails to Reverse Gravity:  
America Continues to Decline 
Steve Clemons directs the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation and publishes 
the popular political blog, The Washington Note.
Taking stock of President Barack Obama’s relative progress or failure after a year in office cannot easily be measured in the behavior of American foes as those challenging the US tend to be 
pushing against American interests no matter who is President. But what of allies?
Four strategically significant allies of the United States – Germany, Japan, Israel and Saudi Arabia – have 
each been saying “no” to Obama’s White House. Each has rebuffed the new President on key Obama 
policy asks without consequence – this itself illustrating the severe decline in global American power. 
The United States and its new President presume that they sit at the head of the global power table, 
but increasingly, the world sees a formerly great nation that has fallen, that has traded substantive 
power for pretense, and which is seen as increasingly impotent for not realizing that it must re-earn 
its leadership rather than asserting illusions.
ASSERTIVE ALLIES
At the London G-20 economic summit while the global economy tilted towards collapse, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s and Barack Obama’s polite but serious debate about fiscal expansionary 
policies vs. fiscal conservatism during the crisis became the distinctive memory of that Summit – 
overshadowing the swirling efforts of UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nikolas 
Sarkozy to steal the show. Merkel rebuffed Obama’s economic leadership and views, and Obama, 
swallowing pride, maintained an image of cordiality and friendship with Merkel despite her refusing 
to budge.
Japan, which like Germany was defeated by the US and then was stood up and rebuilt via American 
patronage and stewardship, has undergone significant political change with the Democratic Party of 
Japan’s defeat of the long-time ruling Liberal Democratic Party. For years, the United States has acted 
as if the basic “do what we say” dynamic towards Japan would never be challenged despite a clear 
domestic struggle over what Japan’s emergent national identity should become, over what a healthy 
nationalism should look like, and how Japan should reposition itself given a fifty year security alliance 
with the US and the complicating emergence of China.
Japan’s Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama is apparently trying to demonstrate that America is trailing 
history rather than leading it, with the US defensively trying to protect a Futenma Air Station base-
swapping arrangement made between the environmentally-insensitive and corruption-blind LDP 
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and George W. Bush’s administration. Hatoyama 
promised during his campaign that the basing deal 
would not go through, and despite some bludgeoning 
of Japan’s Washington Ambassador by Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton over the issue – and direct 
pressure from Obama on Prime Minister – Hatoyama 
has refused to walk the course the United States has 
been pushing, despite threats that Japan failing to 
yield might undermine core tenets of the relationship.
Ultimately, the US obsession with the Futenma 
arrangement shows weakness rather than strength 
because given China’s rise, the US needs Japan’s 
economic and military resources as a full partner, not 
in ambivalence. The US would be undermining its own 
security to trade the broad strengths of the US-Japan 
security relationship with the relatively minor issue of 
moving the controversial Futenma Air Station – which 
many don’t remember was the very first “deal” done 
by then-US Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale and 
then-Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in 
the aftermath of the rape of a 12-year old Japanese 
girl by three American military servicemen. The deal 
then was to absorb Futenma into the huge American 
air base on Okinawa and combine the Air Force and 
Marine operations within the enormous base land 
mass already under US control. Ultimately, inter-
service rivalry on the American side undermined 
this keystone of agreement on a number of security 
revisions in the relationship. Obama and Clinton have 
shown little historic understanding of the roots of 
the Futenma problem – but beyond that have rattled 
sabers in such a way that shows the Obama team is 
threatening something it can’t afford to lose, thus 
further enhancing the political benefits to Hatoyama 
of seeming to resist American pressure.
Saudi Arabia is not often acknowledged publicly 
in Washington as an ally – but in many ways for 
decades, the Saudis have been America’s most 
significant strategic ally in the Middle East, moving 
oil production and supply in patterns that helped 
America’s strategic interests and partners. Most 
recently, the Saudis used their influence on Pakistan 
in providing subsidized oil to that state to help move 
Pakistan to take bolder actions against al Qaeda 
and Pakistan Taliban groups in the SWAT region. 
When George W. Bush was running for President, 
his father arranged for then-Saudi Ambassador to 
the US Prince Bandar al-Sultan to give secret foreign 
policy tutorials on the candidate’s campaign airplane. 
During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US 
was allied with the Saudis in arming and equipping 
the Mujahadeen, many of whose leaders then are 
US enemies today.
But recently when asked by President Obama to put 
forward a number of key concessions toward Israel 
as part of the “opener” in changing the dynamics 
of Middle East-Israeli antagonism, Saudi Arabia King 
Abdullah refused. The King had already initiated and 
resurrected several times a normalization proposal 
between the Arab League and Israel first offered 
in Beirut in 2002 – only to see it largely ignored 
and used occasionally and symbolically by the US 
administration at moments of political expediency. 
The King warned President Obama that Israel’s new 
Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, would ultimately 
embarrass the President and embarrass those who 
put too much into the ante too soon in restarting 
the Middle East peace process. Not only did the 
Saudis rebuff Obama, they proved to be correct – 
identifying early on that the Obama White House 
didn’t realize that America’s superpower status had 
been punctured badly during the Bush years and that 
before states would throw their lots solidly behind 
American leadership, the White House would have 
to prove that it had power to reshape and sculpt 
global relationships. Being told to trust responsible 
behavior by Israel was not a convincing first move 
by the Obama team toward the Saudis.
Finally, Israel itself said “no” to the United States and 
Barack Obama in the loudest and most politically 
consequential way. Largely a client state of the 
United States, overwhelmingly dependent on US 
aid and transfer payments as well as an iron-clad 
security guarantee, Israel’s schizophrenic approach 
to Palestine and a two-state solution has been one 
of many frustrating realities of the Middle East peace 
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process. Prime Minister Ohlmert’s government repeatedly and passionately stated that 
Israel’s only chance at survival as a Jewish state and democracy was to make a two state 
solution work. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government is highly ambivalent at best about 
the position of the previous government and has done much to undermine any progress 
in negotiations with the Palestinians.
In order to kick-start the peace process in the wake of the Gaza conflict, Barack Obama 
selected the distinguished peace-forger and former US Senator George Mitchell to take 
on the task as envoy. To convince the Arab world it was serious the Obama White House 
committed itself to pressure Israel to halt all new settlement activity as Israel’s ante in 
the process. This raised hopes in the Arab world that Obama was serious – but raised 
hackles inside Israel that the US President would ultimately sell out Israel’s equities and 
basic security.
Netanyahu demonstrated his statecraft skills in a high stakes but successful gamble 
in knocking back Barack Obama. The Prime Minister rebuffed decisively the notion 
that settlements could be the portal through which Middle East peace talks could be 
restarted. Consequently, the Obama White House – which often internally compares 
itself to a hybrid of the Lincoln and Kennedy administrations – found that Netanyahu 
had become what Khruschev had been to Kennedy. Netanyahu, an ally, had shown the 
limits of Barack Obama’s power to resculpt Middle East realities – at least so far until 
there is some escalating political crisis between Israel and the US in which the American 
President reclaims the heavyweight champion ring from Netanyahu.
Each of these episodes have their distinctive political circumstances and ought to be 
grouped together only cautiously, but the fact remains that America’s allies are rebuffing 
the US more regularly and overtly than would have been imagined a decade ago. Global 
analysts often refer to the troubling behavior of problematic nations like Iran or North 
Korea or non-allies like China and Russia as measures of America’s current weak position, 
but it is in the decisions of allies that the absence of what had been long-established 
equilibriums becomes clear and worrisome. 
Despite the global fascination with Barack Obama and his inspiring oratorical sketches 
of what the world could expect of itself and what nations could collectively do to meet 
the enormous challenges ahead, the world at the same time doubts America’s ability to 
achieve the objectives it sets out for itself. 
The world sees the US unrealistically threaten Japan with strategic rupture over a minor 
basing issue on Okinawa where the United States actually maintains 39 separate military 
installations. It sees the US try to convince the Arab world that it is serious about Israel-
Palestine peace by promising a settlement freeze and then reversing itself and acquiescing 
to Israel’s recalcitrant Prime Minister. It sees the long-term, back room managed US-Saudi 
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relationship contribute nothing to Obama’s script for Middle East peacemaking. It sees 
Barack Obama politely humbled and rebuffed by Germany, a global capital surplus nation, 
at the London G-20 meeting when Germany’s own growth and welfare are tied in part 
to reflating the US economy which consumes German exports.
A PROGRESSIVE REALIST PATH
America’s current national security objectives are greater than its means – and the White 
House is demonstrating that it can’t juggle all of these challenges simultaneously. American 
power and leverage are being dissipated in too many failed causes. It’s time to rethink 
America’s national security course and to re-prioritize its core goals.  The key to rebuilding 
American power is accomplishing something real that the US said it would do – to gain 
momentum from small success followed by a next success. 
Recognizing the constraints today on American power, Obama nonetheless can reinvent 
America’s position by scoring well-thought-out wins by defying conventional wisdom and 
not giving in to countervailing forces. Restarting a credible Russia-US effort in reducing 
WMDs and nuclear materials, which the Obama team may pull off, may be one such 
positive gain. Pushing through normalization of relations between Syria and Israel comes 
to mind. Ending the restrictions on American citizen travel to Cuba and finally ending an 
anachronistic Cold War 90 miles of US shores would also buy Obama some global credits. 
The key is for the White House to overcome the structural collapse of American power 
during the Bush years by convincing allies through its prudent actions that America is worth 
backing again and following.  Renewed and refocused momentum in the US foreign policy 
agenda may convince foes that America’s considerable assets would be more shrewdly 
used to help lead the world into a new, more stable and reorganized equilibrium. 
Only this kind of progressive realist path will secure a positive foreign policy legacy for 
President Barack Obama and assure that the US re-earns its way back to global leadership 
from its current position as an anachronistic, reactive power falling behind events rather 
than leading them.
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